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Abstract
The analysis of the adaptive behaviour of many different kinds of systems such as
humans, animals and machines, requires more general ways of assessing their cognitive
abilities. This need is strengthened by increasingly more tasks being analysed for and
completed by a wider diversity of systems, including swarms and hybrids. The notion
of universal test has recently emerged in the context of machine intelligence evalua-
tion as a way to define and use the same cognitive test for a variety of systems, using
some principled tasks and adapting the interface to each particular subject. However,
how far can universal tests be taken? This paper analyses this question in terms of
subjects, environments, space-time resolution, rewards and interfaces. This leads to a
number of findings, insights and caveats, according to several levels where universal
tests may be progressively more difficult to conceive, implement and administer. One
of the most significant contributions is given by the realisation that more universal
tests are defined as maximisations of less universal tests for a variety of configurations.
This means that universal tests must be necessarily adaptive.
Keywords: universal tests; human, animal, plant and machine intelligence; test in-
terface; signal resolution; time.
1 Introduction
The prominent physicist, Stephen W. Hawking, has long lost his ability to speak,
but is relatively fortunate in having assistants who can follow his facial cues and
in having speech-generation equipment. We are not aware of any deficiency in his
input (hearing) senses, but we should not deny his notable intelligence merely
on the grounds of his limited output (limited in both mode and speed) and
how that would severely hinder him on conventional intelligence tests. Other
cases, such as deaf-blind people and those enduring locked-in syndrome, are
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stunning examples of how an individual’s will to communicate can counteract
many limitations of a hampered (or awkward) communication channel, through
the development of new semantic signals and languages. Establishing commu-
nication through an unconventional channel can be a real challenge for a peer in
those cases, and may take months, or years, to make the first semantic contact,
with the subject(s) being considered ‘vegetative’ until that moment.
Another case is that of locked-in syndrome, a condition which Kate Allatt
once had. She can now communicate normally, but she had been assumed to
be in a vegetative state until it was realised that she could communicate —
and spell out words— by blinking her eyes. A third case in the point is that
of Canadian Scott Routley, again assumed to have been in a vegetative state
until it was very recently discovered by examining MRI brain scans that he is
able to hear and respond to “yes”/“no” questions via mental imagery. These
cases describe people whose (auditory) input (or hearing) appears unaffected
but whose intelligence would not be apparent if we did not allow for their slow
output speed and their less than conventional modes of output.
It is now commonly agreed that intelligence is not specific to (some) hu-
mans. More and more life forms are attributed to also have some kinds or
degrees of intelligence. The number and ranges of species claimed to be in this
category have been increasing in the past decades, from mammals to molluscs,
from swarms to plants [94]. Nonetheless, there is still an important debate
on whether some of them just exhibit a very complex behaviour (evolutionary
species adaptation) rather than a truly intelligent behaviour (individual, non-
hardwired adaptation). This already complicated picture of intelligent forms
is completed (or will be completed) by machines and robots of many kinds,
some of them already flaunting some kinds of intelligent behaviour. Similarly,
there is a recurrent debate on whether the behaviour is authentically intelli-
gent or just pre-programmed. And, finally, to really make the picture full, we
should also consider hybrids (e.g., people with pen and paper, with electronic
devices and Internet connection, etc.) and communities (either homogeneous or
heterogeneous), where the notions of intelligence and mind may diverge.
Intelligence (or more generally, cognitive) tests are the scientific instruments
to measure and categorise the kinds and degrees of intelligence (or more gener-
ally, cognitive abilities) of this variety of subjects. Comparative psychology has
used many different types of tests to detect and compare abilities across species.
Many tests are particular for some species (or even for some subpopulations or
ages in a given species), and only a few have been used for many species, being
very specific in terms of tasks or evaluated abilities. One of the most difficult
issues is the configuration of an appropriate interface for each species or indi-
vidual, in order to guarantee an appropriate administration of the tests, trying
to ensure that the subject is focussing on solving a given task.
When moving to the area of artificial intelligence, the use (or just the pro-
posal) of the same test for natural and artificial subjects has been uncommon,
apart from Turing’s imitation game [95], and the occasional application of IQ
tests to specifically-devoted machines [24, 26, 25, 80, 10, 9]. It is only very
recently that the construction of non-anthropocentric intelligence tests for ma-
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chines has received more attention [17, 18, 49, 19, 66, 34, 37, 35, 61, 41, 54, 21,
44, 55, 62, 47].
In this context, [41] introduced the notion of ‘universal (intelligence) test’,
as a test that could be administered to any kind of subject, at any speed, and
interrupted anytime. The notion of a ‘test for all’ soon generated widespread
interest [58, 6], even though the proposal highlights some concerns about the
difficulty (or even the feasibility) of such an idea, especially if we consider the
evolution of comparative psychology in the past century. In fact, a new disci-
pline called universal psychometrics [46, 45] is suggested as an umbrella area
of convergence for the general evaluation of cognitive abilities of any kind of
subject (with or without universal tests).
The notion of universal tests does not, in principle, entail what these tests
look like and how they are generated. Nonetheless, it has been recently argued
[41, 46, 45] that the approach for universal tests must be based on computa-
tion and, more specifically, on algorithmic information theory (or Solomonoff-
Kolmogorov complexity) and (two-part) compression [88, 99, 100]. This con-
trasts with the idea of applying anthropocentric tests for machines, such as the
use of the Turing test or common IQ tests to evaluate artificial intelligence.
While the reasons for the inadequacy of the Turing Test are easier to under-
stand and have been spotted by many (see, e.g., [34]), the justification of why
IQ tests are not for machines (or for biological systems other than humans) is
more cumbersome [20].
While most of the above work has been motivated by the lack of proper
tools to evaluate machine intelligence (and other cognitive abilities), the same
rationale and principles could be used for natural subjects. In particular, in
this work we analyse the notion of universal intelligence test in a more abstract
way and analyse how universal an intelligence test can be. In particular, we
will try to answer several questions: Can a test cover any kind of natural or
computational subject, operating at any signal resolution and time rates? What
resolution aspects should we consider? How crucial is the interface in a universal
test? How can we dare measure the intelligence of subjects that we struggle to
detect? Do we need intelligence to detect and measure some other intelligent
subjects? How are validity, reliability and efficiency affected by a generalisation
of a test?
In what follows we will go through these questions with a most general per-
spective, by considering that subjects can be machines, humans, non-human
animals, plants, and other natural, artificial or hybrid systems. We start in
section 2 with an overview of the wide range of intelligence tests in natural
systems and machines. Section 3 describes what a universal test is and how it
depends on the use of different interfaces for different kinds of subjects. Section
4 further generalises this idea by discussing possible configurations of time and
resolution, and sketches a general procedure for an adaptive universal test. Sec-
tion 5 examines more extreme cases where we do not know the rewarding system
or we do not even recognise (in the beginning) the agent we want to evaluate.
Finally, section 6 introduces a hierarchy of test universality levels according to
several factors. We discuss the difficulty of universal tests according to this hi-
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erarchy and their feasibility for more constrained (but easier) applications that
are expected to be common in the near future.
2 Background
Intelligence [91], in particular, and cognition [82], in more general terms, is
nowadays associated with a diversity of species in the natural world. This di-
versity goes far beyond humans and the animal kingdom, as intelligence has also
been recognised (or claimed) in swarms, plants, fungi, immune systems, bacte-
ria, genome and metabolic systems1 [94]. Some of the arguments in favour of
such a diversity of systems showing some kind of intelligent behaviour are based
on examples of classical conditioning [32] or some kinds of complex behaviour
[2], even though some of these findings and claims have also been disputed [79].
The controversy is stronger for the possibility and detection of extraterrestrial
intelligence, and the possibility and construction of machine intelligence. Never-
theless, the terms artificial intelligence and machine cognition are used nowadays
to describe systems which lack intelligence and possibly any authentic (embod-
ied) cognition.
Most of this controversy is originated by the lack of agreement of what intel-
ligence is and how it should be measured. One important issue to understand
this is the so-called intelligence anthropocentrism, where the very notion of in-
telligence (and cognition) is frequently said to be a human construct aimed at
humans. Psychometrics (see, e.g., [91, 8]) is the most mature (and now robust)
discipline in terms of intelligence evaluation, but it is also the most anthropocen-
tric one. As for the measurement of intelligence and other cognitive abilities,
one remarkable characteristic in psychometrics is that we can have different tests
for the same ability, depending on the kind of subject. For instance, we have
different tests for children, disabled people, etc. It is important to note that
while the tests (the instruments) are different, the ultimate purpose is to mea-
sure the same ability. And here the problems arise, because it is easy to raise
objections about whether a test corresponds to an ability2. It is also a source
of controversy whether a minor detail in how the test is conceived (or just ad-
ministered) could have important effects on the measured ability. Nonetheless,
on occasions, the use of different tests and interfaces (e.g., a written or an oral
test) for different subjects (e.g., a deaf person or a blind person, respectively)
is the only way to measure the same ability.
When looking at ways of evaluating cognitive abilities in a general way, com-
parative psychology (and cognition) [82, 83] is the place to look at. First, it has
made a very important impact by looking at the problem in a less anthropocen-
tric way. Second, it usually deals with the problem of using different tests for
different species in order to measure the same ability. Third, it is an excellent
1The kind of intelligence which is not associated with a centralised brain is sometimes
known as non-neural.
2This objection is often responded with statements such as “intelligence is what the intel-
ligence tests measure” [7].
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source of how interfaces can be designed, from individuals to swarms. However,
its comparative character casts a shadow of relativity in the tests, as the cor-
respondence between the ability and the tests is usually more empirical than
theoretical.
A very different approach is found in artificial intelligence. Over the past
decades, there have been many proposals to evaluate AI artefacts or areas of
the discipline: specific tests (Turing Test [95, 75], the total Turing Test [81]
and other sensorimotor variations [74], the Bot Prize [51], CAPTCHAs [97], the
machine intelligence quotient [105, 5], ... ), competitions (RL competition [101],
Robocup [57], general game playing competition [30], planning competition [64],
...) and landmarks (Deep blue [13], Watson [28]).
Of course, one can argue that different tests are required to measure dif-
ferent abilities (e.g., planning, visual recognition, natural language, etc.), but
is it reasonable to have different tests for the same ability (e.g., intelligence or
learning ability) if the subjects are different? As a response to this we should
mention that there have been some advocates for the use of the same tests for
(at least) humans and machines, namely the use of IQ tests for machines. The
roots can be traced to the development and understanding of cognitive models,
such as the works of Evans [24, 26, 25] and, indirectly, those of Simon and Ko-
tovsky [84, 59]. Nowadays, there is a field known as “psychometric AI” —not
to be confused with universal psychometrics [46, 45]—, where IQ tests are used
to improve and evaluate artificial intelligence systems. Nonetheless, the most
explicit vindication of the use of IQ tests for machines has been recently made
by Detterman, editor of the Intelligence Journal, as a response [15] to specific
domain tests and landmarks (such as Watson). In other words, this view claims
that human-level intelligence should be measured with human-level intelligence
tests, i.e., IQ tests.
However, there are many objections to the use of IQ tests for non-human
agents, not only for animals (see, e.g, [82, sec.1.1.4]) but most especially for
machines (see [20] for a full discussion). The main argument is that it is possible
to find or construct non-intelligent agents that can score well on classical IQ
tests, as has been demonstrated with very small programs (in 2003, Sanghi and
Dowe implemented a small program in Perl which could score relatively well on
many IQ tests [80]). This raises serious doubts about the real implications of
any non-human (natural or artificial) system that is evaluated using IQ tests
(e.g., [22, 104]). It is not clear either that a generalisation or revision of current
IQ tests to make them more general is a sound pathway, as we could end up with
tests that work with a specific population or in terms of a current technology, but
need to be updated recurrently as the population is enlarged and AI technology
improves (as happens with the notion of Machine Intelligence Quotient [105, 5]
or, more blatantly, with CAPTCHAs [97]).
Despite the variety of tests for humans, non-human biological systems and
machines, there is a thing in common for all these tests: they lack a formal (and
in most cases, principled) notion of intelligence from which the tests are derived.
In other words, the ability is finally defined from what the test measures instead
of deriving a test from a principled definition of the ability. At most, for the
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k = 9 : a, d, g, j, ... Answer: m
k = 12 : a, a, z, c, y, e, x, ... Answer: g
k = 14 : c, a, b, d, b, c, c, e, c, d, ... Answer: d
Figure 1: Examples of series of Kt complexity 9, 12, and 14 used in the C-test
[34].
tests discussed so far, there may be a conceptual analysis of the nuts and bolts
of the ability prior to devising the task(s) that may correspond to the ability.
However, even in these cases, the link is usually made at an non-mathematical
level. Also, the derivation of task difficulty is not obtained from a mathematical
definition of the ability but as a refinement of the experimental results of a
given population. In the end, this is the same way that thermometers and
other measuring devices were designed in the past, without precisely knowing
the exact definition of the magnitude to be measured and the physical processes
involved.
As an alternative to these approaches, in the past two decades, there have
been several efforts to derive definitions and tests of intelligence from compu-
tational principles. The relevance of (algorithmic) information theory (AIT),
or Kolmogorov complexity, to this goal was first hinted at by Chaitin [14] be-
fore being independently elaborated upon in [17, 18, 49, 19, 34, 37, 35] with a
series of tests noting the relevance and importance of the notions of (algorith-
mic) information theory (or Solomonoff-Kolmogorov complexity) and (two-part)
compression [88, 99, 100]. An example of one of these tests formally derived from
computational principles is shown in Figure 1, which resembles some exercises
found in IQ tests but with a principled generation and assessment of difficulty.
These works were followed some years later by Legg & Hutter [61], who built
upon re-inforcement learning by also using AIT, putting a Solomonoff-weighted
prior distribution over single-agent environments. A measure (or definition, but
not a test) of intelligence could be theoretically obtained (in the limit) by seeing
what score the agent would obtain after infinite time in each of the infinitely
many environments. There are several issues about the feasibility and exact
interpretation of such a measure, as raised by [50, 41], among others.
3 Interfaces
From the previous series of contributions on definitions, measures and tests
based on AIT, the project anYnt3 was set to analyse the possibility of con-
structing the first universal, formal, but at the same time practical, intelligence
test. The term universal had been used and understood in different ways by
many of the previous proposals, frequently in terms of concepts such as uni-
versal Turing machine, or the use of the term ‘universal distribution’ for any
3http://users.dsic.upv.es/proy/anynt/
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Solomonoff-weighted prior distribution. In this project, however, the term ‘uni-
versal’ had a more common meaning and referred to the applicability of the test
to any kind of individual, i.e., a test for all.
Pursuing this universality, taking into account the limitations of [61] and
other previous approaches, [41] introduced an adaptive test which was anytime
(able to be interrupted at anytime giving a more accurate result as more time
is given) and also (supposedly) universal —i.e., applicable to machines, humans
and non-human animals alike. While also based on algorithmic information
theory, there are some distinctive features of this test, which distinguishes it from
[61]. First, the class of environments is carefully selected to be discriminative.
Second, while environments are randomly sampled from that class using an a
priori distribution (starting with very simple environments), the complexity of
the environments adapts to the subject’s performance. Third, the test also
considers time and, similarly, the speed of interaction adapts to the subject’s
performance. Finally, the result is not an average of results in all possible
environments but an aggregation of how far an agent can reach in terms of the
complexity and speed of the environment.
While some of these features are related, we are mostly concerned in this
paper about the alluded universality of the test. If feasible, this universality
should allow the comparison of very different subjects with the same tests. As
a first proof-of-concept, [54, 55] attempted an implementation of the test using
the environment class introduced in [38]. Actually, humans and AI agents (using
some classical reinforcement learning algorithms) were evaluated using the same
test. While the exercises were exactly the same, the interface was adapted to
each kind of agent. The general idea of a test for all was illustrated, but the
results did not show a clear victory of humans over AI agents. There are several
possible explanations for this [21, 44, 47, 53, 56, 48]: it was a prototype, it
was not adaptive as the original proposal [41], there was no noise, patterns had
low complexity, the environment class was quite limited, no social behaviour or
other factors were evaluated, to name a few. In any case, the results do not
indicate that the prototype is not a universal test, but rather that it does not
measure intelligence properly.
In fact, the main feature of a universal test is that the task must be exactly
the same while the interface has to be customised for each individual. In other
words, a universal test is composed of a task and an infinite number of possible
interfaces. Figure 2 shows this view of interfaces and tasks.
π1
taskinterfaces scoresagents
π2 u2
φ1
φ2 μ
μ u1
Figure 2: Two interfaces φ1 and φ2 for the same task µ in order to evaluate two
different kinds of agents pi1 and pi2.
The application of a single task to different species is an everyday chore in
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comparative psychology, as is the choice of interfaces that are able to engage an
animal to do a task (typically by the use of rewards) without adulterating the
task itself. However, when the number of species for a single test is limited, the
task and the interface are sometimes blurred.
The meaning and emphasis of a universal (cognitive) test is the intention to
apply the task to any possible agent: including humans, non-human animals,
plants, communities, hybrids, ..., and most especially machines. Even for those
agents that clearly lack the ability (e.g., a flea solving sudokus), the intention is
to figure out a way to measure the ability and give a score. This most general
way forces us to place the conception of a test in terms of a general, abstract and
computational task. We start with an information-processing ability, define it
properly as a set (or distribution) of tasks with a scoring system. Only after this,
we may start thinking about interfaces to apply the task to any possible system.
This computational approach is now also present in comparative and animal
cognition, and particularly in animal evolutionary linguistics, constructing tasks
about the kind of grammars (regular, context-free or contextual) several species
are able to recognise [31, 76, 33, 23, 77]. From there, the evaluators figure out
the best way of turning these tasks into tests by the use of appropriate interfaces.
This first understanding of what a universal test is and its possible appli-
cation to any natural or artificial system also suggests that the question of
whether universal tests are possible or not could be further refined into a more
informative question: which tasks can be measured with a universal test and
those that cannot. In principle, we may be able to construct universal tests for
all information-processing tasks but, at the other extreme, it may also be the
case that no universal test can be constructed for any task.
Before addressing this question (or the general question of this paper), we
need to look at the interfaces more closely. One reasonable criterion for a fair
interface is that it cannot add new information or hide existing information
about the task. For instance, if one interface discloses part of the solution while
another does not, then the test would be adulterated. One possible mathemati-
cal way of defining an interface is by the notion of bijection, as done in [46, 45].
Nonetheless, there might be computational costs associated with the bijection,
so the mapping must have some other constraints.
Even under these constraints, there are still many possible interface choices
for a given agent. One typical approach is to find the best possible interface that
does not add any additional information. For instance, humans and animals get
much better scores when observations are represented in terms of environments
they are used to, i.e., species or culture-friendly interfaces. For instance, Figure
3 shows two different interfaces for the test developed in [54, 55, 56]. While
the information is the same and the (computational) effort to transform the
observation from one to the other is straightforward, humans would typically
score much better with the interface on the right.
Clearly, this search for the optimal interface for each species (or individual)
can be applied to any natural and artificial agent. In artificial agents, exercises
are usually presented in terms of data structures (arrays, sets, etc.) instead
of visual interfaces, except for those tasks which are precisely evaluating vi-
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Figure 3: Two possible interfaces for the test in [54]. Left: A very raw interface
as a character string. Right: A snapshot of an exercise using a graphical interface
for humans.
sual recognition or related abilities. For natural agents, things are becoming
more and more complicated. The interfaces used for some animal species are
extremely elaborate and, on many occasions, different interfaces are used for
different individuals, according to the understanding and knowledge of the sub-
ject’s behaviour (e.g., in zoos, aquariums and natural parks, local curators are
usually interviewed in order to decide which kind of interaction and rewards
may be more appropriate for each individual). In the case of plants or other
natural systems, the interfaces are certainly original. In fact, these interfaces are
frequently the key to discover abilities in these systems [94][32][2][79] that were
considered non-existent only a few years ago4. Humans are not an exception
here either, as a great amount of imagination is needed to devise some tests for
disabled people, especially for deaf-blinded, using tactile interfaces [3] or other
approaches [69, 96, 78].
In general, the interface must pay attention to the sensorimotor characteris-
tics of each agent, including other milieux, such as chemical sensors in animals
and plants, and different kinds of data transformation for machines. Many fail-
ures in the past have been caused by important mismatches and misconceptions
of how animals (and computers) should interact, with a strong anthropocentric
bias in our interfaces5
This idea of devising a task and looking for optimal environments according
to the knowledge that we have about each species and individual has been very
fruitful, but it is painstaking in terms of the effort and time that is required to
evaluate new species and life forms. Furthermore, this methodology faces more
problems with machines, as we can imagine any computable behaviour and we
can think of many different kinds of perception, as more and more sophisticated
sensor devices are conceived.
So the grand question about the notion of an intelligent test is whether a
test is able to evaluate a completely unknown agent. The general idea is that
we can only assume some minimal information about the environment or milieu
(either physical or virtual) where the agent is placed. From here, a real universal
test should try to find the best interface (signals, time rate, resolution, rewards)
which leads to the best score, without providing additional information about
4Some of these ideas are being used in better interfaces across species, but also in a pursue
of better interfaces between computers and animals [68].
5The problem also happens in the other direction: evaluating humans with bit sequences
is like evaluating (some) machines or animals with anthropocentric environments.
9
the task at hand. As a result, a totally universal, adaptive test requires a search
in this vast area of time rates and resolutions. In the end, this is what animal
cognition has done in the past decades in a manual (scientific-oriented) way. Is
it possible to envisage such a process in an automated way, at least in some
restricted contexts and for some abilities? In other words, if we are given an
environment with some agents, is it possible to have a test that tries to find the
interface to better evaluate the agents’ ability? This is what we explore next.
4 Time, resolution and universality through test
adaptation
In comparative cognition, interfaces are usually associated with physical things:
a cage with a small door, a peanut as reward, a set of cups, a touch screen, a
light bulb, a set of ropes, etc. Thinking of a test that is able to adapt to all these
possible physical configurations (and do this automatically) is far beyond reach.
Instead of this, in this section, we will consider variations of the same physical
(or virtual) ‘milieu’. For instance, given a screen we can think about many
possible resolutions and colours, given an audio signal in a range of frequencies
we can consider all the possible variations there. In fact, many human tests are
still administered with a sheet of paper, and many different interfaces are still
possible with this ‘rudimentary’ milieu.
If we focus on cognitive abilities as information-processing tasks we can fix
the milieu and examine the possible variations around it. With this restriction,
any interface is in the end a pair of input and output communication channels
(in terms of information theory) with a given bandwidth. If we consider discrete
interfaces, we can describe this in terms of the input/output resolution and a
refresh rate6. For instance, considering time, if the task is the addition of two
natural numbers lower than 10 represented in a unary system, and we agree
on the representation of the numbers in the output channel, there is still the
question of how much time the numbers are going to be displayed and how much
time the agent is going to be allowed to give an answer. If we fix these values
we make the evaluation possible for some agents but this also exclude others.
For instance, plants are now claimed to do some kind of cognition [12], but their
time-scale is much slower than those of animals.
The anytime test introduced in [41] arguably addresses part of the issue of
time adaptively by starting with a very fast interaction rate and slowing it down
as the results from the agent are not good. The direction of the time change
(from very fast interaction to slower interaction) is reasonable as many agents
would also react appropriately if the interaction is neither too fast nor too slow,
and starting at fast interactions makes the adaptation feasible in finite time.
While this is a first approach for making a universal test adaptive on time,
there are more issues in terms of time-scale than those reflected by [41]. Also,
6Although the terms are exactly the same for screens, we consider any possible milieu here,
either auditive, visual or other.
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other kinds of resolutions are not considered.
If we take a closer look at time rate, we see at least two time frames that
could be (adaptively) increased/decreased:
• Working time, which can be the time between questions and answers in a
questionnaire-like test or it can be the time other agents (e.g., predators)
take to make actions or the time the environment makes rewards available.
This is in fact what [41] adapts. This time typically includes the time the
agent needs to act (or write an answer).
• Exposition time: the amount of time the agent gets to be given the informa-
tion before it is removed7. This time frame is usually neglected unless this
is the goal of a study on short-memory (or other kinds of memory abilities,
such as photographic memory). However, if the exposition time frame is
not appropriate, the agent may completely overlook some important data
of a task.
On occasions we want a cognitive ability to consider time, such as measuring
‘reaction time’ [70]. But if time is not part of the ability (e.g., we may want to
know the ability to sort a series of numbers, without considering speed) then we
(or the test) need to find the optimal time windows for working and exposition
time in order to make the test feasible. Let us use the term time configuration
for the set of parameters for a given working and exposition time.
A related, but different thing, is resolution. Although we typically think
in terms of spatial resolution, it is very useful for the discussion that follows
to think of a case where we consider an audio signal, where resolutions appear
on the same signal, using, e.g., frequency and amplitude. For instance, figure 4
[103, 65] shows how a sound signal can carry many different types of information
at several resolutions.
Not only the resolution may be too coarse or too detailed for the agent to see
any relevant pattern, but it can take infinitely many representations. Note that
the detection of the appropriate resolution is different from any pattern that
the signal may carry. This distinction is important, even though both things
(resolution and pattern) are usually closely intertwined8. Nonetheless, while
animals (including humans) usually have innate preprocessing systems that may
be used to capture some resolutions (and ignore others) and see patterns in
them, it is possible to disentangle one thing from the other. For instance, many
7As an example of humans requiring more time than some animals, Ayumu the chimpanzee
[52] is able to note the locations of the numbers 1 to 9 (of which there are 9! = 362880 pos-
sibilities) after only 60 milliseconds observation time. A large proportion of humans struggle
just to see (and recall) the location of even one of these numbers in this time-frame. This
also happens with other milieux, e.g., auditive signals, as the case of a non-native speaker
requiring slower speech or repetitions.
8The recognition of patterns depends on a correct resolution configuration. This is crucial
to the notion of emergence, and can be translated to communication and interaction as well,
since structures emerge from some low-level constituents that have no meaning by themselves.
This recognition of patterns at a previously unknown resolution and time, and its relation with
emergence, has also been explored (see, e.g., [29]), and can also be referred to the cognitive
structures and constructs the agent is creating all along its life [36].
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Figure 4: Dolphins perform a sophisticated use of the sound spectrum
at different resolutions. Whistles and whines are used for communication
and can be seen as horizontal striations and vertical lines, respectively.
Clicks are used for echolocation, which are visible as strong, big wedges
on the top-right of the spectrogram. (GNU-licensed image from wikimedia:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dolphin1.jpg).
artificial pattern (image, speech, etc.) recognition systems have preprocessing
devices that render the information ready (e.g., a bitmap or spectrogram) for
the analysis of patterns. Working with several resolutions and representations
in order to find the most appropriate one may take important time overloads
to process. This of course makes resolution and time also closely intertwined in
real systems9.
The complexity of resolution and the appropriateness of representation is
one of the major issues in artificial intelligence, pattern recognition and machine
learning. This issue, however, has been neglected by most machine intelligence
tests that we reviewed in section 2. Being conscious of these limitations, let
us move forward by considering a communication channel for which we can
define any possible resolution, each of them denoted by the term resolution
configuration.
From here, we just define a configuration θ as a pair of time configuration
and resolution configuration. We want to evaluate a cognitive ability defined
as a distribution of tasks M , i.e., a task class. Consider that we have a set (or
distribution) of configurations Θ. Then we can define:
U(pi,M,Θ) = max
θ∈Θ
lim
τ→∞Υ(pi,M, θ, τ) (1)
where Υ(pi,M, θ, τ) is any test on a family of tasks that is applicable to an agent
pi during time τ (for instance, time-bounded adaptations of [61] or some of the
non-adaptive versions introduced in [41] or implemented in [54]). Eq. 1 above
defines (or generalises) a universal test from a non-universal test. The expression
9It is relevant to mention here that there are some recognition tasks (recognising distorted
letters, as in CAPTCHAs) that do not correlate with some other (higher-level) abilities using
those letters. In fact, the ability of recognising distorted letters is used as a CAPTCHA
because machines are not able to do this well with current technology, not because distorted
character recognition is a sign of intelligence.
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1. The history H is initially empty.
2. Choose a task µ from M , a configuration θ from Θ and a time slot τ taking
H into account.
3. Evaluate during time τ and agent pi with task µ at configuration θ, and
store the result R.
4. Add 〈τ, µ, θ,R〉 to the history H.
5. Go to 2.
Figure 5: A test that adapts to time configuration and resolution configuration.
Υ(pi,M, θ, τ) is an aggregate over the set of tasks M . This must be based on the
result on single tasks, Υ(pi, µ, θ, τ) and can be done in many different ways. One
possibility is to weight by task probability: Υ(pi,M, θ, τ) = Υ(pi, µ, θ, τ)p(µ) (as
in [61]), while another possibility is to define task difficulty and get the result
in terms of this difficulty, as in [49, 34, 46, 45].
This maximisation can be translated into the goal of finding the configuration
such that the test result is optimal for the subject. This leads to adaptive tests,
which search for the appropriate configuration, or at least one that gives an
approximation of Eq. 1 above. In the case we want the test to adapt, there
is a need to have some interactive feedback from subject to testers, in terms
of the score the subject is achieving. With this we are ready to introduce a
first general procedure for an adaptive universal test. Figure 5 shows a general
procedure for evaluating subject pi in an adaptive way.
The relevant part of the previous procedure is how we select tasks and con-
figurations, especially after the first iteration, using the history of results and
the tasks and configurations previously used. This can be seen as an exten-
sion/generalisation of [41] (and ultimately of [61] as well, with the appropriate
modifications). For instance, if the agent’s score has been poor, we can ei-
ther try to find a simpler task or change the configuration (which may imply a
change in the time configuration, the resolution configuration or both). On the
contrary, if the agent’s score has been good, we would be tempted to keep the
configuration and change to a more difficult (or more informative) task.
An important question is how to obtain the final result of the test. Ideally,
if we were able to evaluate all possible configurations and all possible tasks for
an infinite amount of time τ each, the result would be calculated by taking the
aggregated performance on the task class (using its distribution or the difficulty
function) for the configuration that has given the best result. In practice, in fi-
nite time, the test should start with configurations not taking too much time (so
τ can be small) and try as many resolutions as possible as the time configuration
uses larger slots.
So, a universal test for an unknown agent would be a test that makes all the
possible efforts to find a configuration with the evaluee at the best resolution and
time configurations such that the subject can be evaluated in optimal conditions.
Not coincidentally, this is what animal cognition usually does when designing
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an experiment, and, in the most difficult cases, finding the correct configuration
may take decades. Also, as we will discuss in section 6, we are never sure that
the right configuration has even been found.
These difficulties appear even though we have already considered that the
(physical) communication milieu is fixed (e.g., a sound channel or a screen) and
we have also assumed that we recognise the agent and know its reward system.
As mentioned above, we are not going to consider every possible physical milieu.
Instead, in what follows we will consider an environment including both the
evaluator and the evaluee (e.g., the real world, but most especially, virtual
words, such as games, social networks, etc., because of the possible applications
and the higher feasibility of a test of this kind, see, e.g., [40]).
5 Making contact: detecting intelligence
As said above, we now consider that evaluator and evaluee are agents in an
environment. We assume that both can have effect on the environment through
actions and they can perceive changes in the environment. This does not nec-
essary mean that the environment has a spatial configuration where they can
‘move’, as in [38], but just that the possibility of interaction exists (e.g., an en-
vironment could just be a series of communication channels as in the matching
pennies game, the Turing Test or any configuration in between [47]). We also
consider that the evaluee has a goal or reward system that is determined by the
things that happen in the environment. This setting is assumed in multi-agent
systems, games and many other virtual, robotic or physical environments, from
artificial intelligence to biology.
A first situation we can consider is when we know the evaluee’s reward
system so that the evaluator can directly use this by giving more or less rewards
to the evaluee according to its performance. This sets an important advantage
because we can condition the system to do things. Still, we do not know what
communication channel or milieu to use, just how to administer rewards. So the
big challenge here is to determine the way to communicate in the environment.
In order to do this, the evaluator needs to perform actions in order to see
some reactions from the evaluee, in order to understand how to ‘condition’ the
evaluee (to try) to perform a task. With animals, we typically use food for this
(to approach them, make them trust the evaluator, etc.).
Even in a simplified virtual environment, as found in multi-agent systems or
multiplayer games, recognising which channel the agents may use is not always
easy. In general, there may be many possible channels, and communication can
switch to more efficient communication channels with time10. The communica-
tion channel may be extremely original, as we can see in many examples of intra-
or inter-species communication, from primates [106] to bacteria [27]. Nonethe-
10It is common that pre-established communication channels or protocols are omitted and
agents end up communicating through other means that were originally not meant for com-
munication (because the new channel is more efficient, can be concealed from other agents,
or other reasons).
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less, there are many kinds of communication which are not usually recognised as
such explicitly, as the communication that takes place whenever predators and
preys meet, where the very movements and peer positions are an authentic ex-
change of information. In biology, there is a huge variety of ways of contact and
communication, and many are still to be unveiled. In virtual or technological
environments this diversity is also very large now.
Performing a universal test under these circumstances would imply a gener-
alisation of the procedure in Figure 5 by including a variety of channels (along
with the diversity of configurations and tasks). In order to determine that the
channel is working we would still rely on the reward system and start with very
easy tasks, in order to raise the probability that the evaluee makes a correct ac-
tion (possibly by chance) so it can get positive rewards and then start ‘focussing’
on the task.
Still, a much more challenging problem is when we do not know the agent’s
reward system. Without knowing the agent’s goals (or rewarding system) we
may detect reaction, but it is much more difficult to properly apply a test. The
most natural option is to try to learn agent’s goals or rewards by observing
habits, resistance to change, interacting, etc. This is again what ethologists
can do, or what children do when playing with bugs or other animals in order
to understand their behaviour. In order to automate this process (at least
partially), there are several information-theoretic options that could be used to
detect (and spur) agent-environment or agent-agent interaction [92, 102], but
other approaches exist (relational dynamics, information structure, and many
others). Independently of what technique is finally used (and whether they can
work in general or not), if the evaluator is able to discover the agent’s goals then
the test could start as in the previous case, using a generalisation of Figure 5.
In this case, some information about the interaction that was used to determine
the rewards could also be reused as history for the selection of milieu, time
configuration and resolution configuration.
Finally, the most challenging situation is when we have not even recognised
the agent we want to evaluate. In this case, we are left in an environment
(physical, robotic or virtual) and we need to discover whether there are intel-
ligent forms there and try to evaluate them. One of the first caveats in this
situation is that there may be many agents, and they can work collectively. As
a consequence, even if we are able to recognise the individuals, we may fail at
properly recognising intelligence if this only appears as an emergent property
of the collection of agents and not of the individuals (as in swarm intelligence).
The recognition of the goals/rewards of the collective and some way to commu-
nicate with it (in a unified way) is usually more difficult than the recognition of
more integrated intelligent forms.
Either in the form of an individual or a collective, this extremely chal-
lenging case has been occasionally discussed in biology but most especially in
astro-biology. While astro-biology looks for physical signs of complex biologi-
cal molecules, the detection of extraterrestrial intelligence through signals from
outer space has been subject of much interest in the past decades. However,
there is no clear methodology about how to do it (what to scan, as with the
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Figure 6: Left: Pioneer 10-11 plaques (1972-1973) designed by Frank Drake
and Carl Sagan, artwork by Linda Salzman (public domain image from NASA).
Right: SETI’s Wow! Signal detected by Jerry R. Ehman in 1977 (public do-
main image from the Ohio State University Radio Observatory and the North
American AstroPhysical Observatory).
SETI project, and what to send, as with the Voyager space probes). Figure 6
shows an example of an outgoing message (as with the Voyager space probes)
and an example of an alluded incoming message.
One problem is to recognise intelligence from such a transmission (in either
way), and a related secondary problem is to be able to discern and interpret the
message’s intended communication. The interpreting of such a message would
presumably be best done by the (Bayesian) algorithmic information-theoretic
approaches of Solomonoff prediction [88] and/or Minimum Message Length
(MML) [99, 100, 98]. If the (algorithmic) information content (or Solomonoff-
Kolmogorov complexity) of the communication is very low, this suggests some-
thing ultra-regular like a pulsar, analogous to a human repeating the same
sound. If the Kolmogorov complexity is very high, this suggests unstructured
random background gibberish, perhaps analogous to an incoherent human in-
fant. For the message to stand out, it must be like, e.g., (human) language and
have some structure without being totally repetitive. This should mean having
some incrementality in its complexity, with sections of the message depending on
previous sections. In terms of what to put in such a message or how to decode
such a message, Wallace (private communication) [16] considered explaining
arithmetic, then eventually Turing machines, the eventually the Lyman series
and Hydrogen, etc. Solomonoff likewise wrote much about training sequences11
[87, 90, 86][89, sec.7(dolphin talk)].
This ‘contact’ problem corresponds very neatly to our extreme case of a
universal intelligence test where a priori we do not even know about the existence
of intelligence forms in an environment and, if they exist, where they are and
what they look like. One important difference, though, is that in our case we
11Although related, we should distinguish the goal of training sequence (turn a non-
intelligent, possibly Turing-complete system into an intelligent system (see also [42, 43]) from
the conception of a sequence such that it can be self-understood without common previous
knowledge. We will discuss about this issue later on.
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LEVEL Configuration Milieu Rewards Agent
1 X X X X
2 × X X X
3 × × X X
4 × × × X
5 × × × ×
Table 1: Several levels of universality of a cognitive test depending on the infor-
mation we have about the time and resolution configuration, the communication
milieu, the reward system and the agent itself.
assume the possibility of interaction12. This means that the principles could be
the same, but the degree of repetition in the signals could be highly reduced
when the interaction starts. When trying to systematise this, we could use yet
another generalisation of the procedure in Figure 5 where the iteration would
start looking for agents. The use of information-theoretic tools seems to be
appropriate here as well. The mere recognition of an agent in these terms is
ambitious as an agent can emerge (e.g., by autopoiesis) from very simple rules.
For instance, these embodied, minimal cognitive agents have even been found
(as gliders) in very minimalistic environments such as Conway’s game of life
[4]. As there may be many different kinds of agents we may need tools to
determine those that are merely interactive, cognitive or finally intelligent. Any
procedure or test that could be able to eliminate those agents that are not good
candidates for further levels would be useful. For instance, once an interactive
system is found we could first determine whether we have a cognitive system,
adapting some of the tasks of the cognitive decathlon and related approaches
[1, 73, 72, 71, 85, 60, 11, 73] (although many of these approaches are focussed
on evaluating cognitive architectures rather than evaluating actual cognitive
systems through multi-factorial scores).
6 Conclusions
The difficulty of recognising (and ultimately) measuring intelligence would de-
pend on a number of factors, as shown in Table 1. This table shows a gradual
view which consists of five possible levels based on four criteria: knowledge of
the configuration, milieu, rewards and agents. On occasions we may have some
other combinations of these factors or we may have partial information about
the configuration (or no information at all about the configuration but still some
information about how the reward system works). Also, more information might
be available for some agents than others. This suggests the use of Table 1 as an
indication of the factors that need to be taken into account.
The less knowledge we have, the more difficulty the evaluation will be, and
12This is also possible in theory with interstellar communication but with a very slow time-
frame.
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we will get lower reliability, efficiency and (probably) validity. In addition,
there is also another factor that we need to consider: how the universal test is
devised, depending on whether the test is conceived in a passive (as classical
paper and pencil IQ tests), interactive (as games, computerised adaptive testing,
the anytime test [41] or any generalisation of figure 5) or ultimately intelligent
way. In this regard, the notion of an ‘intelligent intelligence test’ may sound
strange but it is not new, as this is the way intelligence has been detected and
evaluated for many centuries, as in interviews and other personal (psychological)
assessments. In fact, the Turing test is one example of an ‘intelligent intelligence
test’, since itself requires two intelligent subjects to evaluate a third.
It can be argued that the more intelligent the evaluator is the more effective
the test can be. While this may be true (especially because a superintelligent
being may be able to learn the best procedures to do intelligence testing as they
are discovered), it raises many questions about reliability and validity, since an
intelligent being may not follow a clear procedure or may not even be fair and
objective in the assessment. As there is a subtle line between adaptability and
intelligence, we prefer to envisage universal intelligence tests which are highly
adaptive but follow a formal and standardised procedure.
In terms of reliability, we can also see (from the way the procedure in fig-
ure 5 works) that even when the proper configuration, milieu, reward system
and agent are found then the assessment will still be an under-estimation13.
This originates from the way the overall result of the test is understood: the
procedure tries to find the best conditions for administering the test (i.e., the
measure is a maximum). As a result, the evaluation is biassed to under-estimate
intelligence (as has happened for many years for non-human intelligence and use
to happen with other human cultures). This is a well-known problem in ani-
mal cognition (and also happens with other places where intelligence is sought,
such as plants, bacteria, SETI, etc.). Moreover, this under-estimation also hap-
pens in human psychometrics, where the term “potential intelligence” is applied
to “test potential” [67, 93, 63], (not to be confused with the term “potential
intelligence” applied to the ability of becoming intelligent [42, 43]).
From a computational point of view, we can say that evaluating intelligence
(in a universal context) is, at most, semi-computable14. This comes from the
fact that given an environment that may contain intelligence, there are infinitely
many configurations, milieux, reward systems or agents, and there may always
be some of them that have not been explored (because of the halting problem).
In theory, we could turn this into a computable function or even a function that
can be calculated in bounded space and time, by assuming that configurations,
milieux, reward systems or agents are resource-bounded.
13It is still possible to give over-estimations, such as humans assigning more intelligence to
those animals or machines which have an android look, with anthropocentric sensorimotor
components, as they look more intelligent than they really are. This issue is less frequent
and there is always the possibility of double-checking (once the milieu, resolution, reward and
agent are fixed).
14As we do not consider intelligence a Boolean property but a quantitative one, we do not
use the term semi-decidable here.
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Finally, there is a risk of over-estimation if the evaluator ends up training
the agent instead of evaluating it. During a very long exploration for optimal
configurations we may (inadvertently) train the agent we want to evaluate and
make it more intelligent than it was. In fact, there are training sequences
[87, 90, 86][89, sec.7(dolphin talk)] for any universal Turing machine such that
the machine becomes intelligent (in fact, as much intelligent as we want, as it
can simulate any behaviour, as shown and fully discussed in [42, 43]). So there
is, in principle, a problem in making intelligence tests too long, as the agents
can be domesticated (trained) to become intelligent15. If the agent is trained (or
just domesticated), the test mixes actual and potential intelligence (in the sense
of [42, 43]), and the reliability and validity of the test are highly compromised.
Let us now summarise the results of our exploration about the limits and
caveats of universal intelligence tests. We have seen how intricate the notion of
universal intelligence test is and how difficult its implementation can be, as far
as the challenge is set at the highest level in the hierarchy shown in Table 1.
Nonetheless, the difficulty also depends on the environments and kinds of agents
we want to explore. If we consider all possible natural and artificial agents in our
physical world, a fully universal test working in a reasonable amount of time
is just a theoretical idea. However, if we consider some simple environments
(e.g., cellular automata, multi-agent environments or hybrids [39]) or situations
where we have part of the information of the hierarchy shown in Table 1, we
may still establish universal intelligence tests for those niches.
In fact, there are current situations where we need to determine the intelli-
gence of a completely unknown agent. This is becoming more and more common
in virtual environments, such as social networks, games, working groups, mem-
ber authorisation procedures, etc., where we may find agents whose intelligence
is completely unknown [40]. The Turing Test, custom IQ tests and CAPTCHAs
are unsatisfactory in general terms (and will be less so as artificial intelligence
advances). As new artificial agents, living organisms, collectives and hybrids
thereof become mainstream, we will need to better understand the concept of
test universality and devise more effective universal tests for intelligence and
other cognitive abilities.
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